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FRA UDULENT INSTALLMENT SALES 
IN CHICAGO 
By G. J. ALEXANDER'" 
Fraudulent sales! were made long be
fore the advent of the conditional sales 
contract and are now made, one can be 
sure, in many varying forms. When 
coupled with installment contracts, how
ever, they assume a new dimension of 
viciousness, since the conditional sales 
instrument enables the seller to deprive 
his customers not only of present wealth, 
but, also, to obtain a commitment of fu­
ture earnings. Depending on the gener
osity of the legislature in providing de­
vices to secure credit for the seller's 
legitimate competitors, it may place un
scrupulous sellers in an alm05t impreg
nable financial position vis a vis those of 
his victims who are for financial or edu
cational reasons incapable of asserting 
their legal remedies, the most objection­
able facit of this capability being the fact 
that it depends for its success on judicial 
enforcement of the contract.2 
This paper will attempt to present a 
brief glimpse of the magnitude of the 
problem as it exists in the Chicago area 
and to suggest methods of attack inde
pendent of new legislation. 
For the former purpose, the author in
terviewed: Miss Agnes C. Ryan, attorney 
in the Economic Division of the Chicago 
Legal Aid Bureau, Mr. Carl D. Dalke, 
Manager of the Automobile Division of 
the Chicago Better Business Bureau and 
Miss Barbara A. Davis, Assistant State's 
Attorney in the Fraud and Complaints 
Department. 
Regrettably, none of them was able to 
provide a complete picture, since all dealt 
with other types of cases as well, and no 
records were available which segregated 
the phase herein discussed. 
Miss Ryan is assigned cases concerning 
collections, wage assignments and gar
nishments in the downtown,3 and larger, 
offices of the Chicago Legal Aid Bureau. 
A great preponderance of these cases, ac-
• Bigelow Teaching Fellow, University of 
Chicago Law School. 
cording to her are based on conditional 
sales, and almost two-thirds of them, 
about 800 cases a year, by her estimate, 
contain allegations of fraudulent mis­
representation in conditional sales con­
tracts. Surprisingly, most of the com­
plaints are lodged against no more than 
twenty merchants, with the more promi­
nent among them having a lion's share. 
Also, perhaps not so surprisingly, the la­
ments tend to be quite similar. Thus, 
for a while, there were a rash of cases 
against a certain company charging that 
used televisions, often in bad repair, were 
delivered in place of new ones purchased,4 
while at another time, a company was 
charged with obtaining signatures on sales 
contracts for freezers on the pretext of 
selling food plans in which the use of the 
freezer was included.5 The complainants 
relating such grievances, seem to Miss 
Ryan to fall within a sub group of the 
generally impecunious clientele,6 repre­
senting a lower income and less intelligent 
group with a leaning toward recent im­
migrants to the area. 
At the Chicago Better Business Bu­
reau, Mr. Carl D. Dalke described the or­
ganization's experience with fraudulent 
representations in the sale of automobiles, 
which, according to him, represents a 
majority of complaints based on condi
tional sale abuse considered by the Bu
reau. In 1958, 1,146 complaints were 
processed by the Automobile Division, of 
which 604 alleged misrepresentations in 
the sale of cars as to the price, terms or 
conditions of sale.7 
The fraud complained of in this area 
seems less imaginative than in sales of 
other consumer goods, centering on prac­
tices called "bushing" and "packing" by 
the trade, which involve writing the con­
tract to indicate payments greater than 
those agreed by the parties.s Apparently 
the process is facilitated by having formal 
documents signed in the office of a person 
called a "closer," at which signing, Mr. 
Dalke states, everyone but the customer 
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and "closer" are excluded. How signa­
tures are obtained On contracts, incon­
sistent with the verbal understandings, is 
interesting but tangential to the scope 
of this paper; suffice it to say, that again 
there is a discernible mode of operation 
which varies between individual "closers." 
As was true of grievances reported to 
Legal Aid, the bulk of complaints heard 
by Mr. Dalke's department were lodged 
against a relatively small portion of the 
trade. 
As might be expected, the State's At­
torney's office dwarfs the other two agen­
cies in the number of cases heard. In the 
period January through September, 1959, 
the Cook County office heard roughly 
6,000 complaints in the Fraud and Com­
plaints Division,9 over half of which, 
Miss Davis estimates, concern instances 
of fraud in connection with installment 
sales. Apparently, the cases she bears are 
not dissimilar from the ones related by 
Miss Ryan and Mr. Dalke. She agreed 
that comparatively few companies were 
involved in repetitive fraudulent acts, 
that the successful ruses were usually ex­
ploited and that the victims tended to be 
poor and uneducated. 
A precise study of the abuse indicated 
would undoubtedly be beneficial, but 
even the fragmentary opinions reported 
here seem somewhat astonishing. 
It is interesting to speculate what the 
incidence of fraudulent sales must be, 
considering that the cases reported were 
based On personal interviews or written 
complain1;s and that independent repeti­
tion of the same scheme vouches for the 
complainant's substantial veracity. If the 
aggrieved buyers are as untutored as they 
seem to the interviewers, one might sus
pect that the number registering griev
ances does not represent more than a 
fraction of those who could. 
Most surprising was the fact that there 
was substantial agreement on the identity 
of the offending companies. Despite this 
information, the apparent offenders, with 
few exceptions, were still prospering. 
Their continued existence may be easier 
to understand if the progress of com
plainants in attempting to extricate 
themselves is followed. 
The Better Business Bureau, while ac
tively engaged in investigation and dis­
closure, does not ordinarily seek relief for 
individual complainants. Unless they can 
afford an attorney, these buyers are prob­
ably limited to remedies made available 
by the Legal Aid Bureau or the State's 
Attorney's office. 
At Legal Aid, according to Miss Ryan, 
clients with complaints of the type con­
sidered, cannot hope for substantial relief 
in most cases. Usually, a contract has 
been signed which does not disclose fraud 
on its face; often no proof of fraud other 
than their own word is available. With 
limitations of time and funds, the Bu­
reau policy seems to emphasize obtaining 
settlements, limited in many cases to 
payment of the purported debt over an 
extended period of time. Only cases con­
taining an element other than fraud, 
which can be urged to defeat the con
tract (forgery or minority, for example) 
have a bright prognosis, it apparently 
being felt that allegations of fraudulent 
representations are difficult to establish 
in individual cases. 
Lately, a master filing system for re­
ported sales fraud cases has been estab­
lished by Mr. Arthur K. Young, Director 
of the Chicago Legal Aid Bureau, group­
ing such complaints by companies. Hope
fully, sufficient information will be gen­
erated to suggest warnings to offending 
dealers and to indicate the desirability of 
bringing suit to terminate contractual 
obligations in certain cases. Should suffi
cient suits materialize, the position of the 
guilty traders will deteriorate since, like 
other businessmen, they cannot afford the 
loss of their profits, and fraud, in its legal 
sense, would certainly be a sufficient 
ground for avoiding contracts,lo Fur­
thermore, Legal Aid's proof problem may 
have been exaggerated, for, despite the 
difficulty faced by any single plaintiff 
in establishing the false representation, 
there may be safety in numbers, as to the 
issue of the representations at least, be
cause Illinois practice would seem to al­
low a number of persons similarly de­
frauded to join as plaintiffs in the same 
suit.ll 
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At the State's Attorney's office, the 
complainants fnd some succor. Accord
ing to Miss Davis, there is a strong em­
phasis on settlement rather than prosecu­
tion,12 despite the criminal nature of 
many reported grievances.13 Victims, un
derstandably, are primarily concerned 
with restitution and only secondarily 
with retribution. Since criminal prosecu­
tion does not necessarily accomplish the 
former14 and the victim's chances for 
recovery may be severely damaged by ac
quittal (thus removing the leverage of 
the State's Attorney in effecting settle
ment) it is not surprising that they pri
marily press for financial adjustment and 
tend to be poor witnesses in the event of 
prosecution. While neither the reticence 
of potential witnesses nor the desires of 
victims prevent prosecution, they are fac­
tors to be considered in weighing chances 
of success. 
Another problem in this area concerns 
the ability to convict the dealer. Since 
the crimes involved all require intent to 
commit the act, proof against the dealer 
is more difficult than it is against the 
employees consummating the sales, which 
tends to spare the probable prompter 
whose conviction would be the most like
ly to prevent repetition. 
Unfortunately, settlements avoid the 
deterrent .effect of the laws and probably 
explain the continued operation of the 
offenders who, at most, lose their ex­
pected profit and often are able to settle 
with the complainant by offering a mere 
reduction of the contract price. The 
loss thus incurred seemingly is insufficient 
motivation to alter conduct or to dis
suade others from a similar course. Prose
cution, On the other hand, despite the fact 
that sentences on conviction may not be 
severe,15 would probably effectuate some 
reform. 
The actual sentence in a criminal case 
is only a segment of the total discomfort 
and expense involved. Other considera­
tions include the unpleasantness of ar
rest, detention with suspected criminals 
and the expenses of bail and counsel. The 
conviction may itself have a sobering 
effect, regardless of the sentence, since ab
sent condemnation the offender could 
consider his practice merely "good busi­
ness." 
These considerations indicate the desir
ability of increasing prosecutions even in 
face of apparent problems.16 Should such 
increase fail to terminate the offending 
conduct, a fortifying remedy suggests it­
self in the dOC;trine of public nuisance. 
Without undertaking a definition of 
"public nuisance" for the moment, it 
seems clear that the state has the power 
to have· such nuisance abated. At com­
mon-law this could sometimes be accom­
plished by an order following conviction 
for the misdemeanor of creating or main­
taining a public nuisance, 17 a remedy 
which, of course, is still available in those 
states which have adopted the common­
law in this respect and in those where it 
has been codified. Irrespective of its 
existence, however, there was ·and is a 
remedy in equity to enjoin continuation 
of nuisances. IS 
To the extent that the equitable rem
edy is applicable to acts which also con­
stitute crimes, other than the crime of 
public nuisance, there has been unfavor
able comment.19 Since equity has no 
jurisdiction to restrain crimes, as such,20 
writers urge circumspection in extending 
chancery remedies in this area. Of pri­
mary concern is the lack of traditional 
criminal safeguards, of which denial of 
jury trial, the presumption of innocence 
and burden of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt are the most discussed. Actually, 
the denial runs to all of the protections 
that distinguish our criminal procedure 
from civil procedure. Furthermore once 
an injunction issues, continuation of the 
act can be dealt with summarily as con
tempt of court while otherwise it would 
be merely the basis of another prosecution, 
and it is urged that, since equity's juris­
diction is premised on the inadequacy of 
the legal remedy, it should not in any 
event hear cases which could be dis­
posed of by criminal trial.21 Despite these 
objections, courts of equity have found 
the power to abate such nuisances.22 To 
the objections concerning criminal safe­
guards, the courts have answered that 
they are not concerned with the crimes, 
288 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 
as such, but are merely suppressing the 
nuisance or punishing contempt of their 
orders.23 Faced with the objection of the 
adequacy of prosecution, they have found 
the remedy to be impracticable due to 
surrounding circumstances or insufficient 
protection for the public.24 
It would, perhaps, be less difficult to 
overlook the entire controversy if one 
could delimit "public nuisances." Rely­
ing on ancient precedent, one could then 
relegate "nuisance" cases to chancery 
with a clear conscience despite litigation 
concerning criminal issues. On examina­
tion, however, circumscription becomes 
impossible. The term "public nuisance" 
appears to be so broad that it merely ex­
presses the conclusion of the court's will
ingness to hear a given case or class of 
cases.25 Some courts have gone to the 
extreme of classifying all continuous 
criminal acts as "public nuisances"26 
while other decisions are sufficiently er
ratic to make it impossible to predict 
which acts will be considered within the 
class,27 nor will reference to the defini
tion prove very helpful. Blackstone de­
fines common (public) nuisance as, "a 
species of offenses against the public order 
and the economical regimen of the state; 
being either the doing of a thing against 
the public order and the economical regi
men of all the king's subjects, or the 
neglecting to do a thing which the com
mon good requires."28 
Despite criticism,29 using the label 
"public nuisance", courts of equity have 
invoked the injunctive remedy in those 
areas where sufficient danger to public 
interests was apprehended.30 One area 
analogous to fraudulent conditional sales 
has already been the subject of such judi
cial scrutiny. 
At least ten states have considered 
whether a continuous usurious loan busi­
ness constitutes a "public nuisance" abata
ble in equity (not including those states 
where injunction is specifically prescribed 
by statute). Of these, six have held it 
does,31 four have held otherwise.32 The 
cases are, of course, not parallel. Usury, 
where proscribed, is the subject of a spe
cific statute making the legislative intent 
clear, despite failure to provide equitable 
remedies. Fraudulent acts, to the extent 
that they are illegal, are so due to general 
criminal provisions, which provide no 
indication whether the legislature finds 
such acts more offensive in a continuous 
business setting than in a back alley 
transfer. Such an argument, however, 
presupposes a lesser exertion of independ
ent judgment on the part of equity courts 
than the cases indicate. In the final an­
alysis, the courts, not the legislatures, 
decided usury was a menace to the 
"public welfare", sufficiently grave to 
call forth an injunction; the legislatures 
merely enacted proscriptions. No reason 
suggests itself why chancery should be 
more inhibited respecting a phase of 
generally prohibited conduct. 
A court might alternatively find that 
usury has a greater impact on "public 
welfare" than fraudulent conditional 
sales. A vivid picture of destitution sug
gests itself when the victims of "loan 
sharks" are considered. Persons able to 
purchase appliances or an automobile on 
installment credit seem less in need of 
protection. Such distinctions have been 
voiced in connection with application of 
usury laws to conditional sales,33 but may 
be questionable today because of the 
growth of the installment market in 
recent years. In 1925 there were approxi­
mately two and a half billion dollars in 
outstanding installment paper.34 By Sep
tember of 1958, the Federal Reserve re
ported the volume at over 33 billion.35 
The class of persons protected by usury 
laws, passed many years ago, may now 
swell the ranks of installment buyers. In 
1956, twenty percent of all "spending 
units" in the United States with incomes 
under $1,000 were installment debtors, as 
were thirty four percent of those with 
incomes under $2,000 and forty five per
cent of those with incomes under 
$3,000.36 The median amount owed by 
indebted "spending units" with incomes 
between $2,000 and $3,000 was $250,37 
and a large proportion of such units, espe­
cially those with incomes under $3,000, 
had no other liquid assets than currency 
on which to draw.3s 
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Even if the problem of usury is equated 
with current fraudulent practices in in­
stallment sales, and if there is agreement 
that both sufficiently harm the "public 
welfare" to earn the title "public nui­
sance", little authority exists to support 
the adoption of the injunctive remedy in 
fraud cases. In three of the six states 
where such relief was granted against 
usury, usury was not a criminal offense.39 
In three of four states where the remedy 
was denied, it was a crime, and this fac
tor may have infuenced the court, despite 
disclaimer of such influence in the de­
cisions, which focused instead on de
termining whether the acts were "nui
sances."40 Furthermore, extension of the 
equitable remedy into the criminal area 
is, probably, by the better view, undesir
able.41 
Adverse comment about expanding 
equitable intervention into frontier "pub
lic nuisance" cases does not, however, 
apply to the other common law remedy 
against such nuisance: abatement follow
ing criminal conviction.42 Current ardor 
for the swifter proceedings in chancery 
has greatly eclipsed utilization of the 
criminal remedy, despite the fact that 
prosecution was apparently the usual 
method at common law,43 that the crime 
was adopted in this country along with 
its remedial abatement order,44 as part of 
the common-law, and is still in effect in 
some states. 45 
There would appear little reason why 
criminal "public nuisance" should be 
more restricted than the equitable count
erpart. Both are based on the same broad 
definition, essentially considering the ad
verse effect on "public welfare."46 In 
usury cases, an indictment charging pub
lic nuisance has been found proper in at 
least one state.47 
If courts were to apply the criminal 
"public nuisance" doctrine to businesses 
which repetitively use fraud as a sales 
device, criminal safeguards, deemed vital 
to many writers considering the nuisance 
area, would be preserved in litigation de
termining the underlying illegal conduct. 
Being predicated on conviction, the rem­
edy would be slower than injunction in 
application. For the same reason, however, 
courts might find criminal abatement less 
offensive and be readier to apply it. Fur­
thermore, as the "keeper" of property on 
which a nuisance is committed is indicta
ble therefor, the owner of an offending 
business, presumptively the principal of
fender, could be prosecuted without proof 
of actual intent to defraud or fraudulent 
acts on his part.48 
Following conviction, an abatement 
order can be expected to make continua
tion of the "nuisance" perilous. Of 
course, not all methods of abating nui­
sances would be applicable to fraudulent 
sales cases. For example, committing the 
defendant until the nuisance is removed, 
while permissible at common-law,49 may 
be more effective to remove an obstruc­
tion of a public highway than to cause 
termination of fraudulent conduct. 50 It 
seems better in sales fraud cases to order 
the defendant to abate the nuisance, and 
if he persists in his illegal operations after 
the order, command the sheriff to ac­
complish the abatement.51 Having given 
the defendant opportunity to reform, it 
would not seem too harsh to order the 
premises padlocked. Another alternative 
is to order the defendant to abate and 
treat non compliance as contempt of 
court.52 
Illinois appears to be one of the states 
in which common-law criminal nuisance 
is recognized. While a specific statute 
deals with public nuisances53 it has been 
held that the conduct therein proscribed, 
not including any act applicable to the 
instant problem, is merely declaratory of 
the common Iaw54 and does not exclude 
unenumerated common-law nuisance�.55 
Unsettled as yet is the question whether 
the statutory remedy, providing for abate
ment by the sheriff at the defendant's ex­
pense,56 has superseded the common law 
remedy. In People v. Livingston,57 the 
Illinois Appellate Court reversed a County 
Court's order that the defendant abate 
the nuisance of which he had been con­
victed. The opinion held the lower court's 
jurisdiction limited and, therefore, bound 
to the statutory prescription of abate­
ment by the sheriff.58 No indication is 
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given how the appeal would have been 
decided had a criminal court of general 
jurisdiction rendered judgment, except 
that stress placed on jurisdictional limita
tions would seem to be premised on a 
recognition of the existence of common­
law remedies. 
If Illinois courts are limited to the 
statutory remedy, it would seem that they 
might still order the sheriff to padlock 
the premises of offenders with previous 
similar convictions. 
Another group, aside from the de­
frauded buyers, would seem to suffer 
rather directly from the offending con
duct: the legitimate competition. Not 
depending on deception for their profit, 
they may be unable to match the "offers" 
made by fraudulent sellers, while sharing 
the resultant bad publicity. Less directly, 
perhaps, these dealers are harmed by legis
lative action designed to curb the abuses 
which may also result in limiting the 
scope of their operations or their remedies. 
By applying "public nuisance" doc
trines some courts have enjoined illegal 
conduct in suits by such competitors. De
spite the fact that "public nuisances" are 
primarily the concern of the state, an 
exception has long been made for per
sons who suffer substantial injury distinct 
from that suffered by the public.59 Com
petitors have sometimes been found to fall 
within that exception.60 
From the standpoint of the defendant, 
an equitable action presents the same 
problems whether initiated by an indi
vidual or the state. Perhaps in suits by 
competitors, chancery is more justified in 
its intervention. The criminal remedy, 
which might seem a reasonable ground for 
denying the state an injunction, is not in 
any true sense available to the private 
plaintiff. Normally, prosecutions are con
ducted by the government, which has a 
considerable amount of discretion in the 
timing of cases and choice of defend­
ants.61 Furthermore, if the plaintiff has 
suffered damage by the illegal act of his 
competitor, there is an independent 
ground for invoking civil jurisdiction, 
not present in suits by the state.62 It 
would seem that, denied an injunction, 
the legitimate dealer is helpless against 
illegal acts by a competitor, since they 
are not a legally recognized tort. Absence 
of alternative remedies is itself a strong 
argument for equitable intervention.63 
One would suspect that the hardest 
part of the plaintiff's case would be proof 
of damages. Except in rare cases,64 diffi
culties arise in showing deprivation of 
trade by the defendant's actions. While 
customers, absent the illegality charged, 
might not have dealt with the culprit, 
they might well have gone to another il
legal operator, thus equally depriving 
the plaintiff. Alternatively, they might 
have dealt with a legitimate competitor 
or have abstained from buying entirely. 
Arguably, they might have dealt with 
the offender on a legitimate basis. 
In practice, however, courts may not 
require a rigorously logical demonstra
tion,65 though some have been meticu
lous.66 
Tied to the same problem is the ques­
tion whether injury to trade is a recog
nized "damage" at law. Many courts 
analyze the damage requirement in terms 
of the plaintiff's "property right>" in his 
business operation and consider interfer­
ence therewith "property damage." Ac­
cordingly, courts have granted injunc­
tions against unlicensed professional prac
titioners, relying on the "property right" 
or "franchise" inherent in the license, 
while others have refused such relief find­
ing no "property right."67 Courts have 
also enjoined unlicensed competitive trans­
portation services finding "property" in 
the franchise,68 but have refused to en­
join a barber's competitor who cut hair 
on Sunday in violation of a Sunday Clos
ing law,69 and architects' unlicensed com­
petitors,70 since the plaintiffs, in these 
cases, did not have "property rights" to 
protect. A number of courts, however, 
find a broader "property right" in the 
conduct of a lawful business, thereby en
abling the proprietor to enjoin illegally 
operating competitors.71 
The term "property right", as used in 
cases of business competition, would seem 
to express a conclusion, of which perhaps 
the clearest demonstration exists in the 
case of trademarks. Some courts call 
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trademarks "property rights" in invok­
ing injunctions a g a i n s  t competitive 
abuses,72 yet the primary "property" in 
the right would seem to be the ability to 
enjoin others from their use.73 In other 
cases of commercial competition, the 
property concept is equally elusive. Cer
tainly, a businessman has a "property 
right" in his lawful business, in the sense 
that it cannot be expropriated, in most 
cases, without compensation; but this is 
not the question. The question is whether 
there is a sufficient "property" interest 
for a court to protect against illegal com
petition. 
In the professional license cases, as an
other example, many courts have struggled 
over the question whether the licensing 
statutes were designed to protect the pro­
fession or the public in determining the 
sufficiency of the "property interest" in­
volved.74 Even assuming that the legis
lature was protecting members of the 
profession, however, it does not follow 
that they included a "property right" 
secured by equitable remedies, since had 
they considered this one of the privileges 
of the license, their intent could well have 
been articulated in the statute. Undeni
ably, licenses become "property rights" as 
soon as equity enjoins unlicensed practice, 
but such reasoning is circular. 
The rule that any person engaged in 
lawful business has sufficient standing to 
enjoin competitors from continuing il­
legal acts, having a reasonable relation­
ship to loss of his customers, has much to 
commend it, probably providing the only 
remedy for this class of victims and bol­
stering standards of the trade by giving 
dealers a palatable alternative to joining 
in marginal practices to keep their share 
of profit. Since the competitive commer
cial setting provides more than average 
temptation to abuse remedies, one might 
expect competitors to eagerly denounce 
each other as "fraudulent" dealers, or 
threaten such action unless their com
plaint is "settled." Perhaps, for this rea
son, it would be more desirable to have 
sui ts ini tia ted by associations of the class 
of dealers affected by the illegal acts. 
Organizations of this type would not 
only be less suspect of harassment but 
better able to compile and present salient 
facts concerning the damage caused by 
the offending conduct. Regrettably, since 
associations are heirs to their members' 
faults, the only guaranteed virtue in hav­
ing them appear as parties is the reduc­
tion in the number of potential plaintiffs. 
Coupling the problems inherent in setting 
such a group in motion with the difficulty 
of proving the defendant's continuous 
illegal conduct, however, may be a suf­
ficient deterrent to abuse in light of the 
discretionary nature of the injunctive 
remedy. 
The Illinois position on injunctions 
against "illegally" operating competitors is 
unsettled, having been given only cursory 
attention when considered. In Excelsior 
Steel Furnace Co. v. F. Meyer f§ Brothers 
Co., 76 the court was asked to end a pat­
ent infringement and to enjoin the de­
fendant from stamping certain competi­
tive items as patented, contrary to fact. 
The court said: "In so far as appellee is 
manufacturing articles like those that ap­
pellant manufactures and has falsely 
stamped upon them that they are pat­
ented, we are of the opinion that equity 
will not interfere in the way and manner 
indicated in this bill. We do not believe 
equity has jurisdiction at the suit of one 
trader in an article to enjoin another 
trader in a similar article from telling 
falsehoods about his own article. It is 
not charged as to these articles that ap­
pellee is telling any falsehoods about ap­
pellant's articles, but merely that he is 
telling falsehoods about the articles which 
appellee manufactures.76 That was the 
entirety of the opinion on point. 
In Edelman Bros. v. Charles Baikoif,77 
the court considered the propriety of an 
injunction against certain persons who 
allegedly violated Chicago municipal ordi­
nances prohibiting solicitation of trade 
on public sidewalks as an unlawful nui­
sance, subject to fine, and forbidding re­
lated acts. The suit was brought by per­
sons claiming to represent "most of the 
merchants" in said neighborhood78 alleg­
ing that the defendants were molesting 
prospective customers. Essentially, the 
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complaint stated that the defendants were 
continuously engaged in hawking wares 
and doing other acts on the sidewalk in 
front of their own stores to induce pass­
ers by to enter, hurting the plaintiff's 
trade both in that customers were inc 
duced to deal with the violators, and in 
that they avoided the neighborhood be
cause of the annoyance. 
The court affirmed the denial of a de­
murrer, finding the acts a nuisance and 
a "property right" in the continuation of 
lawful business. Unexcused acts which 
interfered with lawful business were held 
sufficient damage to sustain the injunc­
tion and "special damage" was found in 
the loss of trade. Finally, the court spe
cifically rejected the argument that the 
available criminal remedy prevented equi­
table intervention. In short, said the 
court, the "gist of [the allegations] is 
that the defendant's daily and continuous 
acts . . .  are especially injurious to com­
plainants in their trade and business and 
in the established good will of their cus­
tomers; i.e. in their property rights."79 
This was sufficient, the court held, to en­
join the nuisances. 
Illinois has sustained the right of a 
single attorney to enjoin the unlicensed 
practice of law.80 An injunction has also 
been upheld against the unlicensed prac­
tice of three chiropractors by five of their 
licensed competitors.81 
Finally, Jones v. Smith Oil and Refin­
ing Co. 82 should be noted. In that case, 
the plaintiff was a retail oil service station 
operator, whose complaint alleged that 
his competitor was using an illegal lottery 
to attract customers. The court, in an 
opinion affirming the injunction, mainly 
considered the lottery question, and, after 
finding the acts constituted lottery, gave 
short shrift to the remaining problems: 
"It is argued strenuously by the appellant 
that the courts have no jurisdiction to 
LECTURE 
grant an injunction to restrain a person 
from committing a crime, and this is, in 
effect, what the granting of an injunc­
tion is doing in this case. The injunction 
in this case was not issued on the theory 
that it was to restrain the appellant from 
committing a crime, but on the theory 
that the contemplated plan was a viola­
tion of law and the same would be unfair 
competition of trade against the appellee, 
and if permitted to continue would seri­
ously interfere with the business of the 
appellee, and for this reason the injunc­
tion was issued. Under such conditions it 
is our opinion that the injunction was 
properly issued."83 
The Illinois cases seem to indicate a 
recognition of the right to protect one's 
business from continuous illegal competi­
tive acts. The earlier pronouncements of 
the Excelsior Steel case appear contrary 
but there is no indication that the court 
had been asked to consider the issue of 
illegality in the sale of misbranded goods 
and, without that element, they may have 
correctly found that no action lay. Read 
broadly, the assertions cannot be recon­
ciled with later cases. 
With the ever increasing impact of 
conditional sales on our economy and 
with legislative concern focused on the 
problems involved,84 now is a good time 
to attempt to eliminate the unscrupulous 
element from the group. Whether the 
best road to this end lies in massing civil 
actions, as Legal Aid might, or bringing 
prosecutions, cannot be forecast. At any 
rate, prosecutions can be expected to 
prove more effective, without sacrifice of 
criminal jurisprudential concepts, by the 
rejuvenation of abatement orders on con­
viction. Possibly, competitors are in the 
best position to proceed. It is not neces­
sary to decide the question of priority; a 
combination of the remedies will certainly 
do the job. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. "Fraudulent sales," as used in this paper, 
is intended to be a loose description of a class 
of wilful, deceptive acts on the part of the 
seller designed to result, and resulting, in a 
"contract." It is meant to correspond with the 
layman's concept "being defrauded." 
2. This is especially evident in states which 
enforce confession of judgment clauses, as does 
Illinois. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110 §50 (4) (1956). 
Such clauses enable the seller to obtain a judg­
ment in essentially em parte proceedings, a 
remedy frequently utilized by at least some 
unscrupulous dealers. Of a list of ten com
panies named by a Chicago Legal Aid Bureau 
representative as being those against whom the 
most allegations of fraudulent sales were made, 
A had filed 1,107 suits in the Chicago Munici­
pal Court in 1958; B, 1,085; three others over 
250 each. A spot check of these complaints 
failed to disclose any cases other than confes
sions of judgment in this group. 
3. 123 W. Madison Street, Chicago, Ill. 
4. Orders were taken from catalogs. The 
installment contracts uniformly had the word 
"recond," inserted inconspicuously in the 
description of the set sold. 
5. Almost any issue of The Report (a pub
lication by the Chicago Better Business Bureau) 
reveals other schemes. Sometimes they are 
relatively elaborate. In order to sell furnaces, 
for example, one company alleged.l:y h�d em­
ployees pose as government or utlllty lllspec
tors, who on being admitted to homes to "check 
the furnace " would warn the homeowner of 
mortal danger if the unit was not replaced. 
Alternatively salesmen would offer to check 
furnaces, invariably finding "small " leaks which 
they would offer to fix. The furnace would 
then be promptly dismantled, whereupon the 
salesman would find it hopelessly defective and 
incapable of reassembly without risking the life 
of the family and neighbors. In at least one 
case a public utility representative, called by 
the 
'
homeowner to verify the diagnosis, was 
unable to f nd any defect. Chicago Better Busi­
ness Bureau, The Report, March 10, 1958, p. 4. 
6. The Chicago Legal Aid �ureau limits its 
assistance to persons whose Incomes are less 
than maximal amounts, determined by the 
application of a r,,:ther complex forlI!ula t.o 
economic data obtallled from prospective cll­
ents. 
7. Letter from Mr. Carl D. Dalke to the 
author, August 10, 1959, on fle. 
8. "Bushing" is defned, by Mr. Dalke, as 
the practice of indica tin.g a sales price, i,! a written contract, exceedIng the agreed prIce. 
"Packing" accomplishes a price increase by 
adding insurance or service charges, in excess 
of those agreed, to the cash sales price. These 
practices often account for substantial differ
ences. For example, a certain car lot adver­
tised a car at $445, but indicated the price on 
the purchase order as $495. The "cash price" 
entry on the bill of sale for the same car was 
$655. Chicago Better Business Bureau, The 
Report, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 7. 
9. This figure is based on the complaint 
number in use at the end of the period, com
plaints being consecutively numbered. 
10. 1 Corbin, Contracts 11, 12 (1950). 
11. Weigend v. Hulsh, 315 Ill. App. 116, 42 
N. E. 2d 146 (1942). But see Gombi v. Taylor 
Washing Machine Co., 290 Ill. App. 53, 7 
N. E. 2d 929 (1937). See a discussion of these 
two cases in Opal v. Material Service Co., 9 Ill. 
App. 2d 433, 133 N. E. 2d 733 (1956); and 
see Parties and Joinder oj Actions Under the 
Illinois Civil Practice Act, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 41 
(1948). 
12. Miss Davis remembered only three prose­
cutions, within the last two years, in which 
dealers were charged with multiple violations 
of the penal code. A small number of single 
complaints were also prosecuted in the same 
period. 
13. See Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §253 (1953) 
(false pretenses); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §256 
(confidence game) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §140 
(1953) (conspiracy); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §277 
(1953) (forgery); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §249a 
(1953) (untrue, misleading, deceptive advertis­
ing). 
14. The false pretenses statute specifically 
provides for restitution as part of the sentence. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §253 (1953). None of the 
other statutes listed in note 11 has similar 
provisions. 
15. In the three prosecutions charging mul­
tiple violations, mentioned by Miss Davis, 
supra, note 12, one resulted in the conviction 
of two of three defendants, the convicted per­
sons being fined $200 each. Chicago Better 
Business Bureau, 'I'he Report, August 25, 1958, 
p. 1. The other two, according to Assistant 
State's Attorney Davis, resulted in a similarly 
light sentence in one, and acquittal in the 
other. 
16. Miss Davis stated, in a conversation 
subsequent to the initial interview, that her 
office was in the process of accelerating prose
cutions. 
17. 9 Ha!sbury's Laws oj England 231 (2d 
ed. 1933); 2 Wood, Nuisances 1305 (3rd ed. 
1893). 
18. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 953-
955 (5th ed. 1941). 
19. Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime, 26 
Ill. L. Rev. 259 (1931); Dunbar, Government 
by Injunction, 13 Law Q. Rev. 347 (1897); 
Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 Harv. 
L. Rev. 487 (1898); Mack, The Revival oj 
Criminal Equity, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 389 (1903) ; 
Ralston, Government by Injunction, 5 Cornell 
L. Rev. 424 (1920); Schofield, Equity Juris­
diction to Abate and EnjOin Illegal Saloons as 
a fUb!iy Nuisanc�, 8 Ill. L. Rev. 19 (1913); 
Injunct.on oj Crtmes Without Statutory Au­
thority, 23 Albany L. Rev. 361 (1959). 
20. 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra, note 18, at 
951. 
21. See id. at 949, 950, 950 n. 4. 
22. Re: Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895) ; State 
v. Hines, 178 Kan. 142, 283 P. 2d 472 (1955); 
Bennington v. Hawks, 100 Vt. 37, 134 AU. 638 ��i�6) ; 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra, note 18, at 
23. A good articulation of this idea is found 
in Re: Debs, supra, note 22, where Mr. Justice 
Brewster stated: "The law is full of instances 
in which the same act may give rise to a civil 
and a criminal prosecution. An assault with 
!nt�nt to kill may be punish�d criminally, under 
llldlctment therefor, or WIll support a civil 
action for damages, and the same is true of 
all other offenses which cause injury to person 
or property. . • . So here, the acts of the 
defendants may or may not have been viola­
tions of the criminal law. If they were that 
matter .is for inquiry in other proceedings: The complamt made against them in this is dis­
obedience to an order of a civil court made 
for the protection of property and the s�curity 
of rights. " I d. at 594. 
24. Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N. E. 
680 (1912); State em rel. Burgum v. Hooker, 
. . .. N. D . .... ,87 N. W. 2d 337 (1957). 
25. See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private 
Aption, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1914), especially 
hIS oft quoted phrase, "Nuisance is a good 
word to beg a question with." Id. at 326. 
26. State v. Rabinowitz, 85 Kan. 841, 118 
P. 1040 (1911); [(night v. Foster, 163 N. C. 
329, 79 S. E. 614 (1913). 
.27. State v. Barry, 217 S. W. 957 (Tex. elV. App. 1919) (showing motion picture on 
Sunday in violation of Sunday closing law not 
a nuis�nce) ; Hamlin v. Bender, 173 App. Div. 
996, 1,,9 N. Y. S. 1117 (1916) (same thing a 
nuisance) ; People em rei. Shepardson v. Uni­
versal Chiropractor's Ass'n, 302 Ill. 228, 134 
N. E. 4 (1922) (practice of unlicensed chiro-
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practors not a nuisance) ; Burden v. Hoover, 
9 Ill. 2d 114, l37 N. E. 2d 59 (1956) (over
ruling Shepardson v. Universal Chiropractor's 
AS8'n, 8upra, without specifically labeling the 
offense a nuisance). Notes 30 and 31, infra, 
and accompanying text, indicate the disagree­
ment between states ori whether a business 
dealing in usurious loans is a nuisance. 
28. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law 
of England 166 (7th ed. 1775). 
29. "The distortion of the injunction into a 
weapon of the criminal law can be of no ulti­
mate salutory effect." Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 
499, 499, 450 (1930); see note 19, supra, and 
accompanying text. 
30. In his article on this subject, Professor 
CaldwQIl after analyzing cases states, "The 
foregoing cases indicate that courts of equity 
are tending more and more toward a complete 
recognition of their power to protect the health 
and morals of the public as well as its prop
erty and to prevent threatened interference 
with the security and general welfare of the 
community as well as interference with its 
tangible substances." Caldwell, op. cit. supra, 
note 19, at 266, 267. 
31. Larson v. State, 266 Ala. 589, 97 So. 2d 
776 (1957); State eil) reI. Moore v. Gillian, 
141 Fla. 707, 193 So. 751 (1940) ; State eil) reI. 
Beck v. Basham, 146 Kans. 181, 70 P. 2d 24 
(1937); Commonwealth eil) reI. Grauman v. 
Continental, 275 Ky. 238, 121 S. W. 2d 49 
(1938) ; State eil) reI. Goff v. O'Neil, 205 Minn. 
366, 286 N. W. 316 (1939); State eil) reI. 
Burgum v. Hooker, .. . . N. D . . ... , 87 N. W. 
2d 337 (1957). In Missouri a lower court con
curred. The issue was specifically excluded 
from consideration in the opinion of the su
preme court, reversing on other ground's, Kansas 
City v. Markham, 339 Mo. 753, 99 S. W. 2d 28 
(1936). 
32 Stephens v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App. 
306, 
'
284 Pac. 725 (1930) ; State eil) reI. Boykin 
v. Ball Investment Co., 191 Ga. 382, 12 S. E. 
2d 574 (1940); Commonwealth v. Stratton 
Finance, 310 Mass. 469, 38 N. E. 2d 640 
(1941); Eil) parte Hughes, 133 Tex. 505, 129 
S. W. 2d 270 (1939). 
33. E.g., General Motors Acaeptanae Corp. 
v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S. W. 425 
(1924). 
34. Seligman, The Economics of Installment 
Buying 18 (1927). 
35. 44 Federal Reserve Bull. 1324 (1958). 
36. u. S. Board of Governors of the Fed
eral Reserve: Oonsumer Installment Oredit, 
Part 1 Vol. I, at 87 (1957). "Spending unit " 
is defined as "all related persons living to
gether who pool their income. " Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Id. at 92. 
39. Alabama, Kansas, Minnesota. Larson v. 
State, 266 Ala. 589, 97 So. 2d 776 (1957); 
State eil) reI. Beck v. Basham, 146 Kans. 181, 
70 Pac. 2d 24 (1937); State eil) reI. Goff v. 
O'Neill, 205 Minn. 1l66, 286 N. W. 316 (1939). 
40. Stephens v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App. 
306, 284 Pac. 725 (1930) ; State eil) reI. Boykin 
v. Ball Investment Co., 191 Ga. 382, 12 S. E. 
2d 574 (1940) ; Oommonwealth v. Stratton Fi­
nance, 310 Mass. 469, 38 N. E. 2d 640 (1941). 
41. See note 19 supra, and accompanying 
text. 
42. See note 17 supra. 
43. Board of Health v. Du Pont de Nemours 
Powder Co., 79 N. J. E. 31, 80 Atl. 998 (1911). 
Blackstone writes discussing private wrongs, 
"Let us next attend to the remedies which the 
law has given for this injury of nuisance . . •  
no action lies for common or public nuisance, 
but indictment only . . . " 3 Blackstone, op. cit. 
supra note 25, 219. He was contrasting public 
and private remedies and his remarks should, 
therefore, not be taken literally, their signifi­
cance consisting in the fact that indictment 
was chosen for contrast. The equitable remedy 
would have to be substituted in a moderniza­
tion of the statement. 
44. Ehrliah v. Oommonwealth, 125 Ky. 742, 
102 S. W. 289 (1907); Bollinger v. Common­
wealth, 98 Ky. 574, 35 S. W. 553 (1896); 
People v. High Ground Dairy Co., 166 App. 
Div. 81, 151 N. Y. S. 710 (1915); State v. 
Prudential Coal Co., 130 Tenn. 275, 170 S. W. 
57 (1914). 
45. Miller, Criminal Law 416 (1934). 
46. "It may be said that an indictment for 
a nuisance lies in all cases where the i:njury is 
general, and affects public rights . . . " 2 Wood, 
op. cit. supra note 17, at 1298, 1299. For ex­
amples of the wide range of acts which have 
been prosecuted see id. at 1299 1302. 
47. State v. Diamant, 73 N. J. L. 131, 62 
Atl. 268 (1905). But see Commonwealth v. 
Mutual Loan and Trust Co., 156 Ky. 299, 160 
S. W. 1041 (1913) ; Commonwealth v. Hill, 46 
Pa. Super. 505 (1911), in which such indict­
ment was held improper because usury was 
not a crime. 
48. Wood states, "If any servant in the 
course of his employment, but without my 
knowledge, and even contrary to my orders, 
creates a public nuisance . . . I am liable 
therefor civilly and criminally, even though 
. . .  I could in no sense be said to have done 
the act." 1 Wood, op. ait. supra note 17, at 52. 
49. 2 Wood, op. aU. supra note 17, at 1305. 
50. Also, at least one court has found it an 
improper method. Bollinger v. Oommonwealth, 
98 Ky. 574, 35 S. W. 553 (1896). 
51. People v. High Ground Dairy, 166 App. 
Div. 81, 151 N. F. S. 710 (1915); State v. 
Prudential Coal 00., 130 Tenn. 275, 170 S. W. 
57 (1914). 
52. Ehrliah v. Oommonwealth, 125 Ky. 742, 
102 S. W. 289 (1907). 
53. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §§466 466b (Supp. 
1959). 
54. Town of Manteno v. Suprenant, 210 Ill. 
App. 438 (1917). 
55. People eil) reI. Dyer v. Clark, 268 Ill. 
156,108 N. E. 994 (1915). 
56. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §467 (Supp. 1959). 
57. 331 Ill. App. 313, 73 N. E. 2d 136 
(1947). 
58. "The county court is a court of limited 
jurisdiction and is given certain jurisdiction by 
the constitution, but all other jurisdiction must 
be conferred by statute, and if conferred by 
statute the jurisdiction is limited to such cases 
as are specified in the statute. " People v. 
Livingston, supra at 319, 73 N. E. 2d at 139. 
59. 3 Blackstone, op. cit. supra note 25, at 
220. 
60. Long v. Southern Eil)press, 201 Fed. 441 
(S. D. Fla. 1912), rev'd on other grounds, 202 
Fed. 462 (5th Cir. 1913); Edelman Bros. v. 
Baikoff, 277 Ill. App. 432 (1934). 
61. Miller, op. ait. supra note 43, at 3. 
62. Pomeroy states, "The incompleteness 
and inadequacy of the legal remedy is the cri­
terion which, under settled doctrine, determines 
the right to the equitable remedy of injunc­
tion." 4 Pomeroy, op. aU. supra note 18, at 
936. 
63. Illegal competitive acts have been held 
a sufficient ground for equitable intervention, 
by a number of courts, even without finding 
them a "public nuisance. " Jones v. Smith Oil 
and Refning 00., 295 Ill. App. 519, 15 N. E. 
2d 42 (1938); Glover v. Maloska, 238 Mich. 
216, 213 N. W. 107 (1927) ; Alper v. Las Vegas 
Motel Ass'n, . . . . Nev. . .. . , 325 P. 2d 767 
(1958) ; Ohoctaw Pressed Briak 00. v. Town­
send, 108 Okla. 235, 236 Pac. 46 (1925); 
fi'eatherstone v. Independent Service Stations 
Ass'n, 10 S. W. 2d 124 (Dallas Civ. App. 
1928). 
64. E.g., where the plaintiff is the only 
legitimate source of an item. 
65. In Alper v. Las Vegas Motel Ass'n, 
. . . . Nev . .... , 325 P. 2d 767 (1958), the 
proof apparently consisted of motel owners' 
repetition of statements made to them by 
motorists who said they would patronize com
petitors illegally advertising the cost of lodg­
ing. In Glover v. Maloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 
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N. W. 107 (1927), the damages consisted of a 
decrease in the plaintiff's sales and an increase 
in the defendant's sales. In Featherstone v. 
Independent Service Stations Ass'n, 10 S. W. 
2d 124 (Dallas Civ. App. 1928), the court 
found the damages in "that various prospec­
tive customers of plaintiff left his place with
out making purchases, on discovering that he 
did not distribute tickets for the automobile 
drawing [an alleged lottery] and that, since 
and during the operation of the schemes plain
tiff's business declined, he lost money, whilst 
the defendant's business increased and they 
made money as the result of the scheme." Id. 
at 125. 
66. Goldsmith v. Jewish Press Pub. 00., 
118 Misc. Rep. 789, 195 N. Y. S. 37 (1922); 
MacBeth v. Gerbers Ino., 72 R. I. 102, 48 A. 
2d 366 (1946). 
67. Oompetitor's Right to Enjoin Unlicensed 
Professional Practice, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 714, 
718 (1957). 
68. Wichita Transportation 00. v. People's 
Taxicab 00., 140 Kans. 40, 34 P. 2d 550 
(1934); New York, N. H. <£ H. Ry. 00. v. 
Deister, 253 Mass. 178, 148 N. E. 590 (1925) ; 
Union Traction 00. v. Smith, 115 Misc. Rep. 
73, 187 N. Y. S. 377 (1921) ; Long's Baggage 
Transfer 00. v. Burford, 144 Va. 339, 132 S. E. 
355 (1926). 
69. York v. Ysaguairre, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 
26,71 S. W. 536 (1902). 
70. Arkansas State Board of Architects v. 
Olark,226 Ark. 548, 291 S. W. 2d 262 (1956). 
71. Long v. Southern Express, 201 Fed. 441 
(S. D. Fla. 1912), ,·ev'd on other grounds, 202 
Fed. 462 (5th Cir. 1913) ; Oalifornia Gasoline 
Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Oorporation of 
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Fresno, . . . . Cal. 2d . .. . , 322 P. 2d 945 
(1958); Edelman Bros. v. Baikofj, 277 Ill. 
App. 432 (1934) ; Glover v. Maloska, 238 Mich. 
216, 213 N. W. 107 (1927); Alper v. Las 
Vegas Motel' Ass'n, .. . . Nev . . . . .  , 325 P. 2d 
767 (1958); Ohoctaw Pressed Brick 00. v. 
Townsend, 108 Okla. 235, 236 Pac. 46 (1925) ; 
Featherstone v. Independent Service Stations 
Ass'n, 10 S. W. 2d 124 (Dallas Civ. App. 
1928). 
72. E.g. Oircle Oab v. SpringjieldJ Yellow 
Cab, 73 Ohio Law Abstract 193, 137 N. E. 2d 
137 (1954). 
73. 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 18, at 
962, 962 n. 20. Pomeroy states that, "the 
remedy does not depend upon any true property 
acquired . . . but upon the broad principle 
that a court of equity will not permit fraud 
to be practiced upon the public nor upon 
individuals." Ibid. 
74. Op. cit. supra note 66, at 719. 
75. 182 Ill. App. 537 (1913). 
76. I d. at 539. 
77. 277 Ill. App. 432 (1934). 
78. Id. at 440. 
79. Id. at 448. 
80. Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance 
00., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N. E. 2d 264 (1945). 
81. Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 137 N. 
E. 2d 59 (1956). 
82. 295 Ill. App. 519, 15 N. E. 2d 42 
(1938). 
83. Id. at 523, 15 N. E. 2d at 44. 
84. See Retail Installment Sales Legisla. 
tion, 58 Col. L. Rev. 854 (1958). 
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